Threat model
Permissions and roles grew without a shared model. Assets, actors, inputs, boundaries and abuse scenarios. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
We review controls against actual assets, actors and flows. We prioritize exploitable risk and sustainable changes without presenting a checklist as a guarantee of absolute security.
The goal is to reduce exposure and improve detection, response and learning—not accumulate controls disconnected from the system.
We do not treat each need as an isolated feature. We connect the problem to data, rules, dependencies, people and operations so the solution remains understandable after delivery.
Permissions and roles grew without a shared model. Assets, actors, inputs, boundaries and abuse scenarios. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
Sessions or secrets depend on historical configuration. Authentication, authorization, session, CSRF, XSS, SQL and files. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
Uploads, imports or user HTML lack a consistent policy. Inventory, exposure, rotation and environment configuration. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
Dependencies are not inventoried or prioritized by exposure. Evidence, contextual severity, impact and recommendation. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
Sensitive changes lack sufficient audit history. Reviewable changes with tests and controlled delivery. The decision is documented with owners, boundaries and a concrete way to verify it.
Final scope is agreed against available evidence and the risk to reduce.
Assets, actors, inputs, boundaries and abuse scenarios.
Authentication, authorization, session, CSRF, XSS, SQL and files.
Inventory, exposure, rotation and environment configuration.
Evidence, contextual severity, impact and recommendation.
Reviewable changes with tests and controlled delivery.
Control confirmation and documented residual risk.
Assets, actors and flows.
Code, configuration and operations.
Exploitability, impact and exposure.
Test, delivery and verification.
For PHP security we do not measure progress by code volume. We look for verifiable change in behaviour, risk, team autonomy and operating capability.
We first agree which situation must change and what evidence will demonstrate the outcome. It may be a flow no longer dependent on manual steps, a rehearsed recovery, a centralized rule or a signal enabling earlier diagnosis. Without that reference, a technically correct delivery may still miss the problem.
We then verify that the capability can be maintained: code is reviewable, data retains integrity, failures have a known response and important decisions do not depend on oral memory. Closure includes remaining boundaries and next priorities rather than a promise of perfection.
We make conditions and limits explicit to avoid universal recommendations.
An application review does not replace independent penetration testing where required.
Classification depends on context and existing controls.
Remediation must protect compatibility and operations.
Answers about scope, evidence and ways of working.
We review and harden applications; independent offensive testing is agreed as specialist scope.
No. Security reduces risk and improves detection and response; absolute guarantees do not exist.
Yes when implementation is included, using small changes, tests and verification.
Yes, relating known vulnerabilities to actual use, exposure and upgrade feasibility.
Continue with diagnosis, execution or related experience.
Tell us about the context, the main blocker and the outcome you need. We will reply with the questions required for an initial assessment.